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THE MONOPOLY COMPONENT OF 
INFLATION IN FOOD PRICES 
Honorable Neal Smith, M.C. * 
Inflation is one of America's most serious problems. Since 
about on~ in every five dollars spent by Americans is for food, 
inflation hits us particularly hard in our food prices. The price 
index of food items has risen more than the overall consumer 
price index sfoce the beginning of 1973.1 During this period, pro-
ducers' prices for raw farm products have not kept pace with 
cost increases or inflation, so the consumer food price increases 
have occurred after food leaves the farm. 
Many supposed causes of inflation are often advanced-excess 
demand, excess growth of the money supply, excess government 
spending, government regulation, lagging productivity, excess 
wage demands, the high cost of imported oil, price decontrol, 
and monopoly power-to name a few. I would like to focus on 
monopoly power /1 an increasingly important cause of inflation, 
that I believe has not received enough attention. In particular, I 
would like to focus on the increased price spread between agri-
cultural producers and final consumers which results from the 
power of shared monopolies in the food manufacturing sector of 
the United States economy. A strong case can be made that this 
phenomenon is a direct result of increasing monopoly power in 
the food manufacturing sector. As Willard Mueller put it for the 
economy in general: "The crux of the matter is that market 
power creates an inflationary bias in our economy."8 
Part I examines monopoly power in the food industry, paying 
close attention to the increased economic strength of monopolies 
• Member of Congresa representing the Fourth District of Iowa; Chairman of the Sub-
committee on State, Justice, Commerce and Judiciary of the House Committee on Ap-
propriations; ranking majority member and former Chairman of the House Committee 
on Small Buainesa. 
1 COUNCIL OF EcONOMJC ADVISORS, EcoNOMIC INDICATORS 23 (1980). 
• I define "monopoly (monopsony) power" as the ability of a firm to exercise control 
over the price it charges (pays) for the goods or services it produces (inputs it buys) to 
the extent that such prices are higher (lower) than an equilibrium point where the firm's 
marginal cost (value of the marginal physical product) equals marginal revenue (margi-
nal revenue product). 
• W. MUELLER, THE SocIAL CONTROL OF PRlvATE EcoNOMIC POWER 7 (N.C. Project 117, 
Working Paper No. 44 University of Wisconsin, 1980). 
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and the economic costs caused by monopoly power. Part II de-
tails the problems resulting from monopoly power in one seg-
ment of the food industry-the meatpacking industry. Part III 
calls upon the Congress to undertake new antitrust initiatives to 
reverse the food industry's trend to.ward increasing concentra-
tion. It cannot be said with certainty that food price inflation 
would totally disappear if the consumer loss due to monopoly 
were removed from the food manufacturing and retailing sectors. 
Doing away with these losses, however, would be the equivalent 
of a major reduction in unnecessary industry costs. Such a cost 
reduction, along with an industry restructuring aimed at worka-
ble competition,• would result in substantially lower food costs. 
I. SHARED MONOPOLY POWER IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 
A. The Casts of Shared Monopoly Power 
Pure monopoly power is seldom found in the real world, just 
as the theoretical ideal of pure competition is seldom, if ever, 
found. In reality, there are degrees of monopoly power or de-
grees of competition. There are many examples of domestic in-
dustries which have a few large sellers handling the majority of 
the product-the auto industry, the steel industry, aircraft man-
ufacturing, food manufacturing, and the like. Economists call 
these industries "oligopolies." There are also examples of do-
mestic industries where a few large buyers such as grain export-
ers and meat packers buy the majority of the raw product; econ-
omists call these industries "oligopsonies." A most descriptive 
term which I will use for all of these industries is "shared mo-
nopolies." With respect to the potential for economic abuse, the 
distinction between pure monopoly and shared monopoly is only 
one of degree and not one of substance. 
1. Direct impact of shared monopoly power on infla-
tion-The shared monopolists, via jointly beneficial mutual ac-
tion, have a great deal of freedom and independence over either 
the selling price or the buying price of the products in question. 
Generally, in our society we exalt freedom and independence, 
both personal and economic, as long as that freedom and inde-
pendence does not harm others. Via the antitrust and .restraint 
• I define "workable competition" as a situation where the price of products or inputs 
reflect the true cost of production in terms of foregone alternative production possibili-
ties. See P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS 529 (9th ed. 1973). 
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of trade laws, however, society has decided to limit the freedom 
imd independence of monopolists because their economic actions 
are harmful to the rest of society. 
Shared monopoly selling power11 results in higher consumer 
prices since buyers have no viable alternative in terms of lower 
priced substitutes. Shared monopolists are motivated to charge 
the highest price the market will bear, and to avoid price compe-
tition at all costs. These pricing policies result in higher short-
run net revenue and higher long-run net profits for the shared 
monopolists. Economic models show clearly that a monopolist 
will charge a consumer price which exceeds costs plus a competi-
tive profit, and hold production at a level which is less than 
would be the case in a competitive industry. Thus, society loses 
in several ways: consumers pay more than necessary, a smaller 
amount of the product is available and because of restricted pro-
duction levels there may be fewer jobs available than would be 
the case if the product were produced in a competitive industry. 
Because shared monopolists do not face stiff price competition 
from other firms, they are not strongly motivated to keep pro-
duction costs at a minimum. Thus, unnecessary production costs 
are added into the price of the product, new innovative and 
cost-efficient production methods are not utilized and productiv-
ity may be seriously eroded. Economic theory tells us this will be 
the case. The reality of the American economy of the 
l980's-high inflation, high unemployment, lagging productivity 
and stiff competition from innovative foreign producers-tells us 
that the results of shared monopoly power in our economy must 
be dealt with firmly and swiftly. 
When markets are free of shared monopoly power, competi-
tion minimizes the need for the government to intervene in pri-
vate decision-making to achieve the goals of price stability, full 
employment, and economic growth. Workable competition in-
sures that necessary adjustments in production and consump-
tion are rapidly and efficiently made in response to changes in 
demand and supply. Monopoly power, however, results in in-
creased government regulation. One economist has estimated 
that for the whole economy, consumer loss to monopoly power 
amounts to nine percent of the gross national product-about 
• The case of shared monopoly buying power has similar results except the buying 
prices of inputs (such as raw agricultural products) are lower than would otherwise be 
the case and the producers selling these inputs are harmed. Consumers do not benefit 
from these lower input prices because the monopsonists do not pass on the lower prices, 
rather they reap higher profits. 
152 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 14:2 
$200 billion in 1979.8 With such amounts at stake, the underly-
ing reasons for our antitrust laws should be clear. 
2. Indirect impact of shared monopoly power on infia-
tion-Besides the direct impact of shared monopoly power on 
inflation, there is a potent indirect effect on inflation which 
comes from an upward price and wage spiral.' This happens be-
cause of the interaction of shared monopoly power in industries 
with strong labor organizations. The problem is caused when la-
bor attempts to share in the high profits of shared monopoly 
industries as new wage settlements are being drawn.8 Collective 
bargaining is the process we use to divide returns between capi-
tal and labor, and profit levels have a direct impact on both 
wage settlements and dividends. If high shared monopoly profits 
are partially passed on in wage settlements that are larger than 
justified on a comparative basis with services rendered, those in-
creases cause further problems as they "spill-over" into other in-
dustries. Wage negotiations in a monopolistic industry are not 
entirely independent of settlements in other industries because 
there is some labor mobility and in a time of low unemployment, 
the less profitable, more competitive industry must pay higher 
wages, whether it can afford it or not, or lose its good employees. 
When spill-over causes high wage increases to be achieved in 
more competitive industries the result is "cost-push" inflation. 
In the key shared monopoly industries, the high wage settle-
ments are often welcomed by management as excuses for raising 
prices not only to pass on the higher wage costs but to add more 
in order to boost profit rates. When this is done, more fuel is 
added to the inflation fire and the stage is set for a new round of 
wage and price increases as part of a never-ending spiral. 
Traditional government anti-inflation policies using monetary 
and fiscal tools are frustrated because shared monopoly indus-
tries have the power to raise prices even when they face declin-
ing demand. They raise prices in order to make up for the higher 
unit costs associated with falling rates of output. Traditional 
anti-inflation policy dampens demand with cuts in government 
spending, increased taxes, high interest rates, and tight money. 
Unfortunately, the battle lines of shared monopoly-caused infla-
tion can march right through all but the most severe of these 
government policies. 
8 F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 408 (1970). 
7 STAFF OF THE CABINET COMM. ON PRICE STABILITY, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND COM· 
PETITION POLICY (1969). . 
• Parsley, Labor Union Effects on Wage Gains: A Survey of Recent Literature, 18 J. 
ECON. LIT. 1 (1980). 
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These problems of shared monopoly power create an intense 
squeeze on the farmers of this country. In the purchase of ma-
chinery, tractors, trucks, tires, plows, herbicides, and many other 
products, farmers face some of the most concentrated United 
States manufacturing industries. For the energy and petroleum 
based chemicals that are so vital to farm efficiency, farmers are 
at the mercy of the OPEC oil monopoly and the shared monop-
oly in United States petroleum product refining. When the 
farmer sells his products, he faces food processing industries 
whose degree of shared monopoly power on average, significantly 
exceeds that of other manufacturing industries. In such a set-
ting, the farmer loses on both sides. The exercise of oligopsony 
buying power over the price paid to farmers keeps commodity 
prices low at the farm, and the exercise of oligopoly selling 
power by farm suppliers means that farmers must pay high 
prices for their supplies. If major new antitrust steps are not 
taken soon, the small business, family farm in this nation is 
doomed for reasons unrelated to efficiency or the ability to 
produce. 
B. The Concentrated Food Industry 
The losses due to monopoly power in the food industry have a 
staggering impact upon all Americans. The consumer loss due to 
monopoly in food manufacturing alone represents about 9.5 per-
cent of the industry's payroll and material costs, eight percent of 
the value of shipments, twenty-six percent of the value added, 
and $290 per United States family per year. When the over-
charge due to monopoly power in food retailing, which has been 
estimated to be $942 million, is added to the loss to monopoly 
power in food manufacturing, the cost is $307 per United States 
family per year.9 The farmers in the United States have cer-
tainly felt this impact as well. On the average over the years 
1973 through 1979, the consumer loss due to monopoly in food 
manufacturing represented fifty-two percent of the net farm in-
come of all farmers. 
• Parker & Connor, Estimates of Consumer Loss Due to Monopoly in the U.S. Food-
Manufacturing Industries, 61 AM. J. Ao. EcoN. 626 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Parker & 
Connor]. See also The Profit and Price Performance of Leading Food Chains 1970-74, 
Hearings Before the Joint Comm. in Economics, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (statement 
of Bruce W. Marion and Willard F. Mueller) [hereinafter cited as Joint Econ. Comm. 
Hearings]. Comparisons on a per family basis are calculated using 57.2 million U.S. fami-
lies as reported by BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT (1979). 
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The economic power of shared monopolies in both food manu-
facturing and food retailing has increased dramatically since 
World War 11.10 In 194 7, there were over 40,000 firms in food 
manufacturing and about 350,000 firms in food retailing. There 
are now less than 20,000 firms in food manufacturing and about 
155,000 firms in food retailing. 
After World War II, firms were leaving the food manufactur• 
ing sector at an annual rate ol about one perc~nt-that rate of 
exit has now tripled to three percent. Similarly, the average an-
nual rate of decline in the number of food retailers from 1947 to 
1958 reached 2.8 percent. This time period covers the era of the 
"supermarket revolution" when thousands of small grocery 
stores went out of business. The current rate of exit from food 
retailing is even higher, now standing at 3.2 percent per year. 
Other economic indicators reflect the same alarming trend. The 
percent of food manufacturing assets held by the fifty largest 
companies has jumped from forty-two percent in 1947 to sixty. 
four percent in 1978, and the USDA estimates that it could rise 
to one hundred percent by the year 2000. This estimate means 
that almost 20,000 firms could drop out of food manufacturing 
by the year 2000. It has been estimated that these trends have 
already resulted in concentration powerful enough to elevate 
wholesale food prices an average of ten percent.11 At the retail 
level, the percent of national sales held by the twenty largest 
retail chains has jumped from twenty-seven percent in 1947, to 
thirty-seven percent in 1975. Concentration of sales in individual 
metropolitan area grocery retailing markets has also grown from 
forty-five percent in 1947 to fifty-three percent in 1972.19 
It is clear from these statistics that there are still a large num• 
her of independent firms in the food manufacturing and retail-
ing sectors. The clear trends toward fewer and bigger firms, how• 
ever, must be viewed with increasing concern. Most importantly, 
attention to the relative size of firms within the food manufac-
turing sector reveals a significant decrease in the number of 
firms engaged in direct competition in the production of many 
specific product lines. The relative size of the largest firms, 
moreover, clearly shows potential for the abuse of shared mo• 
nopoly power. 
The overcharge to consumers due to monopoly power in food 
•• See Table 1 in Appendix, infra. 
1I J. CONNOR, THE U.S. FOOD AND TOBACCO MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: MARKET 
STRUCTURE, STRUCTURAL CHANGE, AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Economics, Statistics 
~d Cooperatives Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Ag. Econ. Rep. No. 451, 1980). 
•• See Table 1 in Appendix, infra. · 
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retailing was estimated to be $662 million in 197 4.13 Inflated by 
the consumer price index for food, the estimate for 1979 is $942 
million lost by consumers because of monopoly overcharges14 at 
the retail level. Estimates for the food manufacturing sector re-
cently appeared in an article by Russell Parker of the Federal 
Trade Commission and John Connor of the United States De-
partment of Agriculture. 16 This article presented some truly 
startling research results. The average of the Parker-Connor es-
timates for one year, 1975, is $13 billion lost by consumers due 
to monopoly power in the United States food manufacturing sec-
tor of our economy.18 This estimate, moreover, does not include 
monopoly overcharges paid by farmers for machinery and other 
inputs or monopoly overcharges in food wholesaling and retail-
ing, or in any of the industries that provide inputs and supplies 
to food marketing firms. 
How does this $13 billion annual figure compare with the 
amount consumers lose due to inflation in wholesale food prices? 
Over the years 1973 through 1979, the annual increases in 
wholesale food prices from all causes of inflation totaled $99.3 
billion.17 Over the same period, consumers lost $98.5 billion due 
to monopoly at the food manufacturing level. 18 In other words, 
the loss due to monopoly power was ninety-nine percent as large 
as the increase in food costs due to all causes of inflation. It is no 
wonder that Parker and Connor concluded: 
11 See Joint Econ. Comm. Hearings, supra note 9, at 4. 
" The terms "monopoly overcharge," "consumer overcharge," "consumer loss due to 
monopoly," and "monopoly loss due to market power"· are often used interchangeably. 
As Parker and Connor point out, the term "consumer overcharge . . . is properly used to 
mean only the income transfer from consumers to the monopolist." See Parker & Con-
nor, supra note 9. Total loss due to monopoly power encompasses not only this income 
transfer, but also what economists call "X-inefficiency" due to excess costs incurred by 
monopolists and deadweight social welfare loss due to monopoly underproduction. Loss 
due to monopoly can also be viewed as a loss of what economists call "consumer sur-
plus." I use the term "monopoly overcharge" in a general sense to refer to the broadest 
of these concepts, with the understanding that specific estimates most likely underesti-
mate the totality of such loss. 
•• See Parker & Connor, supra note 9. 
19 "Three independent methodological approaches and data sets are used to estimate 
the consumer loss due to monopoly in the U.S. food manufacturing industries for 1975. 
They include estimates (a) built up from previously estimated components of consumer 
loss, (b) derived from a regression analysis of the relationship of market structure to 
industry price-cost margins, and (c) derived from regression analysis of the market struc-
ture determinants of national brand-private label price differences. All three estimates 
converge to the $12 to $14 billion range. Virtually all of the consumer loss is attributed 
to income transfers; 3% to 6% is due to allocative inefficiency." Id. at 626. 
17 See Table 2 in Appendix, infra. 
"Id. 
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There are significant implications of our monopoly loss 
estimate for public policy. The annual loss to consumers 
in food manufacturing alone is 250 times the combined 
antitrust budgets of both U.S. antitrust agencies and sev-
eral thousand times that part of federal antitrust expend-
itures [for food]. 18 
The food manufacturing sector ranked fourth among the 
twenty major industry groups in our economy based on 1977 
value added. Food manufacturing, furthermore, ranked first in 
1977 value of shipments.10 Obviously, this is one of the largest 
sectors of our economy. But in this sector, only fifty firms out of 
about 20,000 firms accounted for sixty-four percent of food man-
ufacturers' assets in 1978, up from forty-two percent in 1947. 
"Concentration of profits, sales promotion activities, and the 
holding of leading positions by these fifty firms is substantially 
higher, ranging upward to ninety percent. "21 
II. AN EXAMPLE OF SHARED MONOPOLY POWER IN FOOD 
MANUFACTURING: THE MEATPACKING INDUSTRY 
Sixty years ago there were major monopolistic problems in the 
meat industry with meat being sold under manufacturer's na-
tional brand names. As part of the actions taken to re-establish 
competition in the industry, a 1920 consent decree11 was entered 
which prohibited the "big five" packers from engaging in retail-
ing and certain nonslaughter activities. The consent decree and 
the widespread acceptance of federal grade labeling-which 
helped insure non-brand-name, generic sales of fresh 
meat-were major contributors toward a return to workable 
competition in the meat industry. These measures helped to in-
sure ease of entry into meatpacking which resulted in a dramatic 
decline in industry concentration. 
10 Parker & Connor, supra note 9, at 637. 
•• See BUREAU OP THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T o, COMMERCE, 1977 CENSUS o, MANUFAC-
TURERS, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 20: Food and Kindred Products (1979). 
11 Parker & Connor, supra note 9, at 627 . 
.. United States v. Swift and Co., Equity No. 37623. (D.C. Feb: 27, 1920). See United 
States v. Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) for a summary of a complaint and relief 
obtained. For a history of the Consent Decree, see United States v. Swift and Co., 189 F. 
Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1960). 
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A. The Struggle of Small Businesses in the Meatpacking 
Industry 
I have a special concern about the problem of shared monopo-
lies because the economic power of shared monopolies has been 
derived at the expense of the thousands of small businesses in 
this nation. When an industry is composed of thousands of small 
businesses, where no one business can exercise power over buy-
ing or selling prices, we have a situation that goes a long way 
toward approximating the ideal of pure competition. Unfortu-
nately, American economic history demonstrates that more often 
than not small businesses either grow into giants or are driven 
out of business by larger businesses-this represents the para-
dox of development in our free enterprise system. While firms 
are fighting for territory in an industry, consumers seem to ben-
efit. Once an industry is controlled by a few large firms, however, 
the efficiency gains from economies of scale are lost to society in 
the form of shared monopoly costs and profits. 
Within the broad problem of shared monopoly power in food 
manufacturing, the House Committee on Small Business has fo-
cused on the problem in the meat industry. The ongoing Com-
mittee investigation has included two major studies of meat in-
dustry .structure, a study of futures trading, and a computer 
analysis of pricing behavior. Some of the results of this investi-
gation are discussed below. 
1. Increasing concentration-Nationally, the top four firms 
slaughtering steers and heifers18 accounted for about thirty-two 
percent of the total slaughter in 1978. This is not a particularly 
high level of industry concentration. One should keep in mind, 
however, that moving live animals great distances is very costly 
both in shrink, i.e., animal weight loss due to stress and limited 
access to feed and water, and transportation. Thus, concentra-
tion levels in local marketing areas are of much greater impor-
tance than national concentration levels, which are more rele-
vant with non-perishable products. In a special study prepared 
for the Small Business Committee, the USDA reported that in 
the twenty-three states that accounted for over ninety-six per-
11 Slaughter of cattle is generally divided into two major categories: 1) steers and heif-
ers, which account for about seventy-five percent of all cattle slaughter and end up as 
cuts of fresh meat at the retail level and 2) cows and bulls, which account for about 
twenty-five percent of all cattle slaughter and end up in hamburger or other processed 
meat products. See EcoNOMICS, STATISTICS, AND COOPERATIVES SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF 
AGRICULTURE, LIVESTOCK AND MEAT STATISTICS, STATISTICAL BULLETIN No. 522, 81 (1978 
SUPP.). 
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cent of the total fed cattle marketings in 1978, the top four firms 
in each state had over sixty-six percent of the steer and heifer 
slaughter.u This sixty-six percent figure is a statistically signifi-
cant increase over the fifty-six percent concentration level in 
1969. 
It is generally accepted that shared monopoly effects begin ap-
pearing in an industry when four-firm concentration ratios go 
above forty percent. When the four-firm concentration ratio 
reaches sixty percent, the industry is considered to be quite mo-
nopolistic. 211 What has happened in the steer and heifer slaugh-
tering industry over the last decade is that the large firms have 
concentrated at the source of the animals, driving out the com-
petition-a classic case of oligopsony buying power. 
We have not yet observed, however, in all cattle producing ar-
eas, the final result of oligopsony buying power-lower prices 
paid to producers for live animals. The industry is still in the 
final transition to shared monopoly. What has occurred is that 
large packers move into an area and pay higher prices for live 
animals than the existing competition. Thus, the large "new gen-
eration" packers are able to operate their plants at or near ca-
pacity throughout the cattle cycle while existing packers go 
bankrupt in the face of cost increases. During the initial stage of 
this type of industry structural change, cattle producers may not 
perceive the problem because, in the short run, some are receiv-
ing higher prices for their animals. Cattle producers fail to real-
ize that in five or ten years there will be so few small and me-
dium size packers left in the business that the price of live 
animals will be determined totally by what the remaining oligop-
sonists want to pay. When the crunch comes producers, unfortu-
nately, will bear the burden. 
2. Conglomerate control-Thirteen of the twenty-five largest 
cattle feeders in this country are now owned or controlled by 
either meatpacking companies or grain companies. These thir-
teen cattle feeders already represent a one-time capacity of two 
million head or about twenty percent of the total national feed 
lot capacity. 
The wave of conglomerate takeovers and vertical integration 
in the grain-livestock-meatpacking complex is a telling sign of 
the monopoly profits to be made by those with economic power. 
"' See Table 3 in Appendix, infra . 
.. Small Business Problems in the Marketing of Meat and Other Commodities (Part 
7-Monopoly Effects on Producers and Consumers).' Hearings before the Subcomm. on 
SBA and SBIC Authority and General Small Business Problems of the House Comm. 
on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1980) (testimony of Russell Parker). 
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The medium sized packer has little chance to survive when the 
vast resources of international conglomerates are brought to 
bear to subsidize giant meatpackers. These conglomerates fur-
nish capital and sell grain at favorable prices to conglomerate 
feed lots who in turn sell fed animals at favorable prices to the 
conglomerate packer. Instances of conglomerate control are ris-
ing. For example, Cargill, Inc., a privately-held company, is the 
world's largest grain merchandizer with fiscal 1979 sales esti-
mated at $12.6 billion.18 Cargill in turn owns Caprock Industries, 
America's largest cattle feeder and MBPXL, America's second 
largest boxed beef producer and third largest steer and heifer 
slaughterer in 1978. A further example is Continental Grain, 
among the world's top five grain merchandizers and also among 
America's top ten cattle feeders. Esmark, on the other hand, a 
conglomerate which owns Swift (America's second largest steer 
and heifer slaughter in 1978) has retreated from the slaughter 
business as have Armour ( owned by Greyhound) and Wilson 
(owned by LTV). 
A recent USDA study reported: 
. . . cattle feeding has shifted to very large commercial 
feedlot operations using: (1) highly specialized skills and 
technology and (2) industrialized approaches to manage-
ment, financing, and marketing. Large commercial feed-
lots have developed so rapidly that . . . more than half of 
all fed cattle are now fed in 422 feedlots, each of which 
averages over 30,000 head marketed a year, and . . . half 
of the cattle are fed in 131,500 smaller feedlots, each of 
which averages only 90 head marketed annually .... 21 
The three largest groups trading in live cattle futures are grain 
companies, meatpacking companies and commercial feedlots. 
These groups accounted for up _to thirty percent of the total 
short open interest in cattle futures during the period January 
1978 through April 1979, and held enough cattle to potentially 
control up to one hundred percent of the short open interest. 
These figures are significant because control of short positions in 
cattle futures can have a substantially depressing effect on cattle 
·prices throughout the country. 
3. Declining competition and employment-As concentra-
tion has increased in cattle slaughter, the USDA reports a signif-
.. BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 16, 1979, at 68. 
" L. Schertz, et al., ANOTHER REVOLUTION IN U.S. FARMING? (U.S. Dep't of Ag., Ag. 
Econ. Rep. No. 441, 1979). 
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icant decline in slaughter plants.18 From 1969 through 1977, 270 
firms each purchasing more than $500,000 worth of livestock per 
year left the steer and heifer slaughter business.29 This is an av-
erage drop of about four percent of the firms each year, amount-
ing to thirty percent over eight years. During 1978, moreover, at 
least twenty-two major plants discontinued steer and heifer 
slaughtering. 
Meatpacking traditionally has been an industry where small 
businesses can effectively compete. In 1978, for example, of the 
622 steer and heifer firms buying more than $500,000 worth of 
livestock per year, 602 slaughtered less than 300,000 head per 
year. The remaining top twenty firms, however, slaughtered over 
sixty-two percent of the national total with individual slaughter 
totals ranging from 300,000 to over 4,000,000 head per year. The 
majority of firms which can be expected to go out of the steer 
and heifer slaughter business, if present trends are left un-
checked, will almost certainly come from the group of 602 small 
and medium sized firms and/or those firms operating in only one 
location. 
The economic vitality of an industry depends on the vigorous 
competition supplied by new, innovative firms. The giant pack-
ers of today were such firms ten or twenty years ago. But when a 
few firms become large and industry concentration reaches high 
levels, barriers are placed in the path of new firms trying to 
enter the industry. Thus, the competition from new entrants is 
stifled, existing small and medium firms fail, and concentration 
becomes worse. As these trends grow, efficient medium sized 
firms become acutely aware that they could be eliminated and 
become reluctant to risk further investments to update or ex-
pand their capacity. Present economic trends-inflation, record 
high interest rates, the recent low point in the cattle cycle, and 
increasing concentration-have combined to cause a crisis situa-
tion for all but the giant firms in the meatpacking industry. 
4. Price spreads-Other economic indicators tell the same 
story. The USDA recently reported that the farm-to-retail price 
spreads for choice beef and pork were seven cents and five cents 
per pound greater than justified by costs during March-April 
1979.80 Since the farm-to-retail spread measures the difference 
18 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, CONCENTRATION IN THE MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY 6 
(1979). 
19 USDA does not have reliable data on the smallest livestock slaughters. Firms 
slaughtering $500,000 or more worth of livestock (approximately 1,000 head) per year are 
required to report to USDA. 
80 See ECONOMICS, STATISTICS, AND COOPERATIVES SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, 
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between the retail price and the payment to producers for their 
animals, these spreads are an indication of the excessive returns 
to the middle sector. The USDA, furthermore, recently reported 
that the middle spread for all food had widened nearly twelve 
percent in 1979, the largest increase in five years. 
5. Impact on farmers- Increasing concentration in meat-
packing means farmers have fewer buyers for their animals and 
are more and more at the mercy of the remaining large buyers. 
Large commercial feedlots may have eight to ten buyers or a 
financial tie or contract with a major packer, but the farmer/ 
feeder may have as few as one or two buyers who will negotiate 
for delivery to a point that does not involve unbearable trans-
portation cost and shrink. Studies of livestock buying practices 
document the power to depress farm prices concentrated in the 
hands of a few buyers.81 Unfortunately, it is only a matter of 
time until this power is used against all farmers in cattle produc-
ing areas. 
B. Future Trends in the Meatpacking Industry: The Advent 
of Boxed Beef 
Not since the major antitrust intervention in the 1920's have 
advertised manufacturer's national brands been used to sell beef 
in retail food stores. Until relatively recent years, beef moved 
from slaughterers to retailers in carcass form. Most carcasses 
were broken at or near the retail outlets and sold generically. A 
significant proportion of all carcasses are now broken into 
primals and/or subprimals and vacuum packed by the slaughter-
ers. This boxed beef is now shipped directly to retailers, cutting 
out the costs associated with shipping unnecessary bone and fat 
and eliminating the costs of breaking near retail outlets. Retail-
ers then cut the boxed beef into individual portions. 
The idea of boxed beef is not new and was used to some ex-
tent in the 1950's. During the last decade, however, it has spread 
rapidly with about fifty percent of all fed beef currently being 
shipped in the box. Major efficiencies have been associated with 
the boxed beef revolution, but a USDA study shows: 
. . . that cost savings from boxed beef may have been 
overrated. Stores which fabricate carcass beef into con-
sumer cuts at central warehouses can save as much as 15 
AN EXAMINATION OF PRICE SPREADS FOR BEEF AND PORK, (1979). 
•• U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 28, at 20-22. 
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percent in retailing costs. On the average., boxed beef 
costs the same as if a retailer cut a carcass to primals and 
subprimals at his regional warehouse. However, as retail-
ers and packers are further apart, 1,000 miles instead of 
125, boxed beef becomes more attractive. 32 
There is a marketing danger with boxed beef. Once retailers 
convert to boxed beef, laying off meat cutters skilled at breaking 
carcasses and closing down local breaking facilities, they become 
locked into boxed beef. Buying carcasses as an alternative . to 
boxed beef is no longer feasible. Thus, carcass beef is no longer a 
substitute for boxed beef to retailers. Those who hold shared 
monopoly power over boxed beef production, therefore, are now 
the ones who can extract shared monopoly prices. 
At this point in time, all the major boxed beef firms have not 
started product differentiation88 via national advertising, a phe-
nomenon associated with increasing concentration. The second 
largest boxed beef firm, however, the Cargill-owned MBPXL, is 
marketing branded "portion-controlled" fresh beef under the 
brand name "Excel." MBPXL provides retailers with local 
newspaper and radio advertising materials, and has embarked 
81 L. Duewer & T. Crawford, summary to ALTERNATIVE RETAIL BEEF-HANDLING Svs-
TEMS, (Economic Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture Rep. ERS-661, 1977). 
aa Parker and Connor, in estimating the consumer loss due to monopoly, relied upon 
the observation that when a firm grows big and achieves some degree of market power, it 
tends to spend more and more on advertising to insulate its product from the competi-
tion of other firms by creating perceived differences in the mind of the consumer. Obvi-
ously, a particular product is no better than any other product simply because of adver-
tising. If the consumer thinks the advertised product is better, however, then the seller 
has power to increase the product price above the competitive level. This technique of 
trying to create perceived differences which in reality do not exist, is referred to as prod-
uct ditf erentiation from advertising. See Mueller & Rogers, The Role of Advertising in 
Changing Concentration of Manufacturing Industries, 62 REv. EcoN. STATISTICS 89, 90 
(1980). "Advertising-created product differentiation is a major source of market power 
for an individual firm and of industry entry barriers. Because the payoff from successful 
product differentiation is large, firms have a strong incentive to engage in the level of 
advertising necessary to achieve the optimal degree of differentiation." Id. 
Once large scale advertising takes hold of an industry, a major barrier is placed in 
the path of new small businesses trying to start up and in the path of existing small 
businesses trying to survive. Quite simply, small businesses cannot afford such large scale 
advertising expenditures. "IRS data indicate that in 1975 total U.S. advertising expendi-
tures ... by food manufacturers were $4.1 billion .... " Parker & Connor, supra note 
9, at 627. However," ... the bulk of promotional activities currently used for food prod-
ucts ... are largely self-cancelling and simply add to distribution costs." Id. 
One of the most cut-throat battles in any retailing industry occurs over shelf space 
in retail food stores. Thus the firm that spends more on advertising can demand more 
shelf space for its product and more shelf space means more sales. The small or medium 
sized manufacturer faces nearly insurmountable odds in the battle for shelf space. Id. at 
634. 
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on an intensive advertising campaign with television, radio and 
newspaper ads in certain test markets." This meatpacker is tak-
ing charge of everything from killing the animals to consumer 
packaging the meat for retail display. Branded, portion-con-
trolled meats are coming to the retail store just like boxes of 
breakfast cereal, requiring no further processing. Dominant 
firms in the production and distribution of portion-controlled 
meat, aided by the merchandizing power which emanates from a 
nationally advertised brand name, are positioning themselves to 
take control of beef retailing and to force retailers to display 
their products or even to take control and operate retail meat 
shops in supermarkets. 
National brand advertising is already established in poultry, 
pork products and processed meats. Once portion-control is fully 
achieved in beef, an advertising battle among giant packers will 
ensue which will end the medium sized packer's role in steer and 
heifer slaughter-unless we do something to prevent this. 
The United Brands Company "Chiquita" brand banana has 
shown that nationally advertised brand names can be successful 
in most any fresh product. United Brands Company even tried 
to promote a "Chiquita" brand lettuce, attempting to raise the 
price of lettuce thirty to fifty percent through national advertis-
ing. The attempt in lettuce was forestalled, at least in part, by 
Federal Trade Commission action. 811 Thus, the sixty year history 
of unbranded fresh beef by no means insures that nationally ad-
vertised, brand-name fresh beef will not be attempted in the 
near future. 
Sixty years ago, before the 1920 consent decree against the 
"big five" packers, fresh meat was being sold under national 
brand names. Nationally advertised, brand-name, portion-con-
trolled beef is on its way again. If these shared monopoly trends 
are not forestalled, it is only a matter of time before a few boxed 
beef packers will totally control the market. 
C. Detailed Breakdown of Loss Estimates 
A detailed look at the results of the Parker-Connor estimate 
leaves little doubt regarding the extent of the shared monopoly 
problem. The percent of national sales controlled by the four 
" The National Provisioner, January 3, 1981, p.8. 
aa See In the Matter of United Brands Co., Docket No. 8835 (1974) (Thompson, 
Comm., concurring), reprinted in Scanlon, Brand Advertising and the FTC: "Catching 
the Seed, Ignoring the Weed," 7 ANTITRUST L. AND EcoN. 21 (1974). 
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largest firms (four-firm concentration ratio) for the forty-three 
indu~tries within the food manufacturing sector range as high as 
ninety percent. 36 
The 1975 Parker-Connor estimate for meatpacking shows a 
monopoly overcharge from zero to $7 million. 37 This estimate is 
based on minimal advertising levels and a national four-firm 
concentration ratio of twenty-two percent. When the boxed beef 
four-firm concentration ratio is used, along with advertising ex-
penditures commensurate with manufacturer national brand 
names, the estimate increases dramatically. 
Russell Parker of the FTC made a special estimate of con-
sumer loss due to monopoly power in the boxed beef segment of 
the meatpacking industry that is comparable to the overall 1975 
Parker-Connor estimates. He assumed that boxed beef was an 
industry with the same advertising characteristics as broilers 
and hams. Parker used 1975 data on boxed beef production and 
market shares gathered by the USDA. In 1975, the top four 
firms had sixty-one percent of the boxed beef production. Poul-
try and ham advertising rates were used in order to explore the 
consequences of boxed beef producers moving to portion~control 
and starting advertising campaigns to differentiate their prod-
ucts, based upon the 1975 level of shared monopoly power of 
boxed beef producers. Parker assumed that if national advertis-
ing of brand name beef occurs, expenditures would be the same 
percent of value of shipments as occurred in broilers and hams 
during 1975. Understanding that individual segment estimates 
within the food manufacturing sector are subject to greater error 
than the estimates for the entire sector, Parker concluded that 
the shared monopoly overcharge would be 4.9 percent of the 
value of all boxed beef shipments and 8.2 percent of the value of 
manufacturer brand boxed beef shipments. In dollar terms, 
these estimates indicate that in 1975 the consumer loss due to 
shared monopoly overcharge could have ranged from $107 mil-
lion to $143 million.38 Inflating these estimates to 1979 dollars 
•• For the sector as a whole, the ". . . food industry concentration ratio was 52 per-
cent, indicating a significant degree of oligopoly and potential for competitive problems." 
Parker & Connor, supra note 9, at 627. In dollar terms, the largest consumer loss in 1975 
occurred in processed meats, fluid milk, breakfast cereals, bread, cookies, crackers, re-
fined cane sugar, soybean oil, shortening, margarine, beer, soft drinks, flavoring extracts, 
syrups, roasted coffee and other prepared food. See also R. PARKER & J. CONNOR, EsTI-
MATES OF CONSUMER Loss DUE TO MONOPOLY IN THE U.S. Fooo-MANUFACTURING INDUS-
TRIES, (NC-117, Working Paper No. 19, Dep't of Ag. Econ., Univ. of Wisconsin, 1978) 59, 
61 [hereinafter cited as R. PARKER & J. CONNOR, (NC-117)]. 
•• R. PARKER & J. CONNOR, (NC-117), supra note 36, at 59, 61. 
•• See Table 4 in Appendix, infra. 
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gives a range of $133 million to $178 million potential loss to 
shared monopoly overcharge in advertised, portion-controlled 
boxed beef-a truly startling conclusion. 
III. THE URGENT NEED FOR NEW DIRECTIONS AND BOLD 
INITIATIVES 
Antitrust law is founded on economic principles of preserving 
competitive markets and on a social policy that small businesses 
should be preserved regardless of the economic results. 39 New 
antitrust initiatives, founded on these same economic and social 
considerations, must be undertaken: to reverse the ever increas-
ing shared monopoly power in food manufacturing; to return 
this sector of our economy back to workable competition among 
efficient smaller and medium sized businesses; and to make the 
entire system more market sensitive so that periodic surpluses 
result in the kind of reduced consumer prices which move the 
product. 
Recent press reports•0 claim our ninety year old set of anti-
trust laws and enforcement policies lack validity in today's eco-
nomic environment. These types of reports, while conceding that 
outright monopoly is socially unjustifiable, claim that in many 
cases the economies of scale gained in industries with shared 
monopolies outweigh any adverse social costs. Accordingly, such 
reports call for a major relaxation of antitrust efforts. 
I interpret our current economic environment in an entirely 
different light. I believe that basic economy theory, which has 
evolved from Adam Smith to the present day, accurately 
predicts the consequences of shared monopoly power. Shared 
monopolies vehemently resist price competition, resulting in a 
major structural contribution to our current inflation problem 
throughout the economy. Shared monopolies also restrict output 
which results in a smaller supply, thereby keeping prices higher 
than would otherwise be the case and acting as an underlying 
structural force contributing to our unemployment problem. In 
addition, rather than lowering prices to move· their product, 
shared monopolies place the burden of a recession on their em-
ployees by cutting output and laying off workers in an effort to 
.. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427-29 (2d Cir. 1945); 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
•• Bus1NESS WEEK, Jan. 12, 1981, at 90. 
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maintain their shared monopoly profit margins.0 Shared mo-
nopoly power, furthermore, creates an environment where cost-
push inflationary wage gains spill over to the rest of the econ-
omy. Unquestionably, shared monopolies construct -barriers to 
the entry of new firms, thus stifling price competition and inno-
vation. These actions result in outmoded production techniques 
and lagging productivity. And finally, this combination of shared 
monopoly created circumstances in our domestic econ-
omy-higher prices, restricted output, barriers to entry, stifled 
innovation, lagging productivity-invites competition from inno-
vative, productive foreign firms and results in our chronic bal-
ance of payments problem. 
Parker and Connor concluded from their research that to cor-
rect the problem of shared monopoly power, industry restructur-
ing may be necessary. They in turn suggested divestiture and 
compulsory licensing of major trademarks as possible remedies."ll 
Such approaches may be necessary in industries such as steel 
and automobiles where there are no small firms left. Another ap-
proach (which I have proposed for the meatpacking industry) in-
volves two components: first, to define the rules of conduct in 
advance for actors in the marketplace and second, to specify 
firm size limitations before undesirable concentrations of shared 
monopoly power are allowed to develop. This two-prong ap-
proach would eliminate the need to break-up shared monopolies 
via divestiture. Businessmen would have a clear statement of 
how far they can go in extending their control over the market.48 
For meatpacking, the principal elements of this two-prong ap-
proach would prohibit vertical integration by proscribing meat 
retailing by firms which exceed a fixed share (for example, five 
percent) of the national slaughter of steers and heifers, cows and 
bulls, or hogs; insure a competitive market structure by limiting 
a packer's slaughter in any one year to a fixed share (for exam-
ple, twenty-five percent) of the national slaughter of the appro-
priate classifications of livestock; and protect small businesses 
by prohibiting the unreasonable use of economic power or pric-
ing practices intended to eliminate or impair the marketing abil-
ity of small business meatpacking concerns."" 
" Current labor union policies to maximize per hour wages and benefits rather than to 
maximize the number of members employed also contribute to this problem. 
•• Parker & Connor, supra note 9, at 637-38. 
•• See H.R. REP. No. 7197, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) and H.R. REP. No. 5733, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
44 Small business meatpacking concern is defined as any packer which has less than a 
five percent share of the national slaughter of steers and heifers, cows and bulls, or hogs. 
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The imposition of limits on individual firm size or market 
shares may be criticized by some on the grounds that it would 
discourage the development and adoption of cost-reducing tech-
nology. Such limits, it may also be argued, impede aggressive 
competition and protect individual competitors rather than the 
competitive process. When an industry, however, is composed of 
a large number of small or medium sized businesses where no 
one business can exert power over buying or selling prices, we 
have a situation that begins to approximate the ideal of pure 
competition. " 
In free competitive markets, unlike in a concentrated indus-
try, decentralized decision-making allows for more rapid changes 
and flexible responses to changing economic conditions. 46 Cur-
rently, firms can and do take advantage of new technologies in 
the meat industry at firm sizes far smaller than the maximum 
firm size limits proposed. For example, slaughter houses and 
breaking plants with less than one percent of the national pro-
duction can and do employ all the latest technology. Because the 
proposed market share limitations are so much larger than any 
company could practically slaughter at any one or. several loca-
tions, a market share limiting approach would in no way stifle 
innovation; in fact, more decentralized decision-making should 
encourage it. 
Similarly, the integrity of the competitive process would not 
be impaired by market share limitations. This approach neither 
limits the number of firms in an industry nor restricts the entry 
of new firms or the expansion of smaller existing firms. 48 In fact, 
in an environment where it was known with certainty that no 
one firm could grow beyond a certain size, innovation and in-
vestment in new plant and equipment by small and medium 
sized firms would be encouraged because unfair competition 
from industry giants would not exist. 
Market share limitations would impact on aggregate market 
behavior and affect the size of firms. or the independence of indi-
vidual business decisions only if the firms reached a size which 
approached the limit. The social benefits to be derived from de-
centralized and independent decision-making in an industry 
H.R. REP. No. 7197, supra note 43, at Section 3. 
•• Scitovsky, Can Capitalism Survive?-An Old Question in a New Setting, 70 AM. 
EcoN. REV. 1 (1980); Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REv. 519 
(1945). 
•• The spread of product differentiation, especially if fortified by large scale advertis-
ing or promotional expenditures, has a far greater potential to operate as a barrier to 
new entry than market share limitations. 
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which does not limit the entry of new firms or the expansion of 
smaller existing firms far outweighs the social loss resulting from 
the imposition of fixed market share limits. 
The costs of our present antitrust system may not be justifia-
ble. It has been estimated that American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company has spent from $350 million to $500 million in 
its antitrust battle with the Justice Department, and Interna-
tional Business Machines Corporation is expected to spend as 
much as $1 billion in its battle with the Justice Department;n 
Such expenditures as well as ehforcement expenditures by the 
Justice Department would be unnecessary under a market share 
limitation approach. Also, the government welfare program for 
shared monopolists such as Chrysler would be unnecessary. In 
an environment controlled by the market share limitation ap-
proach, the failure of any one firm would not produce the ripple 
effects that the bankruptcy of a firm the size of Chrysler could 
have in today's shared monopoly business world. 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, as the studie!3 now show, the meat industry is 
returning to a state of concentrated shared monopoly power. 
Once again, the industry is returning to highly advertised, need-
lessly differentiated national brand marketing of fresh meat. 
The names of the actors have changed but the script is the 
same. As these shared monopoly practices occur, increased effi-
ciencies :resulting from boxing and portion-control are not 
passed back to the producer or on to the consumer, but rather 
they are wasted on needless advertising and shared monopoly 
profits-causing losses to both farmers and consumers. 
For the benefit of both livestock producers and consumers, 
further concentration of shared monopoly power in meatpacking 
should be prohibited. It is not yet too late to keep the meatpack-
ing industry from turning into the biggest shared monopoly of 
the 1980's, but time is running out. The need for a market share 
limitation approach is clear in the meatpacking industry. This 
antitrust approach, furthermore, should be carefully considered 
for other segments of our economy. 
•• See BusINESS WEEK, Jan. 12, 1981, at 90. 
APPENDIX 
Table 1 
Number of Companies and Concentration in 
Food Manufacturing and Retailing 1947-1977 
Food Manufacturing 
Census Number of Average Annual Percent of Food 
Years Companies Percentage Manufacturing Assets 
Decline of Number Held by 50 Largest 
of Companies from Companies 
Previous Census Year 
1947 41,147 NA 41.6 
(1950) 
1958 36,545 .. 9 45.8 
1967 27,706 -2.5 52.7 
(1969) 
1972- 23,326 -3.0 63.7 
1978* (1972) (1978) 
• Data only available for year indicated in each column. 
SOURCE: Federal Trade Commission. 
Average 4-Firm Number of 
Share of Sales in Companies 
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Table 2 
Comparison of the Annual Costs to Consumers of 
Monopoly in Food Manufacturing and Food Price Inflation, 
1973-1979 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Value of Shipments from Consumer Loss Due Annual Percent Annual Dollars 
Food and Kindred to Monopoly in Food Change in the Increase in 
Product Manufacturing Manufacturing" Average Wholesale Consumer's 
Plants'. Price for Food Food Costs Due 
Products• to Wholesale 
Price Increases• 
$ Billions $ Billions Percent $ Billions 
$135.5 $10.3 22.5% $25.9 
160.6 12.2 13.0 17.6 
171.0 13.0 5.5 8.8 
180.9 13.7 . -2.5 -4.3 
193.1 14.7 6.6 11.9 
218.4 16.6 11.9 23.0 
237.4 18.0 7.5 16.4 
TOTAL $98.5 TOT AL $99.3' 
' Value of shipments of food and kindred products manufacturing plants, 1977 Census of 
Manufacturers, Industry Series (MC 77-1-20), U.S. Department of Commerce, 1979. 1978 and 1979 
amounts are estimates derived by multiplying the 1977 census total value of shipments by the aver-
age annual deflated growth rate of value of shipments between 1972 and 1977 (1.2 percent) and the 
percentage increase in the Bureau of Labor Statistics producer price index for finished food prod-
ucts (the wholesale price index). 
• The dollar amounts are equal to 7.6% of value of shiments shown in Column 1. 7.6% is the ratio of 
the dollar amount of consumer loss estimated by Parker and Connor for 1975 ($13 billion) ex-
pressed as a percent of 1975 total food industry value of shipments. This method of extending the 
Parker-Connor estimate to other years assumes the ratio of consumer loss to value of shipments 
stays constant. The 7.6% is not the total possible consumer loss due to monopoly included in con-
sumer food purchases. Not included are monopoly loss amounts in wholesaling or retailing of food 
products or monopoly overcharges by farm input supply industries. 
• Annual percent change (from December to December, unadjusted) in producer prices for finished 
goods (foods). Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. These inflation (deflation) 
rates apply to food and kindred product prices as charged by the manufacturer to the retailer. Since 
the Parker-Connor's estimate does not include possible consumer loss due to monopoly at the retail 
level, inflation (deflation) rates for consumer food prices were not used. 
• These values represent the dollar changes in value of shipments (Column 1) which are due to infla. 
tion (deflation). Assuming these inflation charges are passed on by retailers on a dollar for dollar 
basis, the total of Column 4, $99.3 billion, can be considered as an estimate of the total "consumer 
loss due to inflation" over the 1973 through 1979 period. Percentages were taken of the previous 
year's value of shipments. Value of shipments in 1972 total $115 billion. 
• Part of the price increase represents an increase in the dollar amount of the monopoly loss between 
1973 and 1979. Subtracting the increase in the annual monopoly loss (7.7 billion) leaves a total due 




















































Four-Firm Concentration Ratios, 
Steers and Heifers, By State' 
Percent of Slaughter Accounted for by 
Top 4 Firms 
1978 
Level of Concentration• 
1977 1978 
85.9 87.6 Very Highly Concentrated 
22.7 26.5 Unconcentrated 
65.4 63.8 Moderately Concentrated 
57.2 61.9 Moderately Concentrated 
86.0 89.0 Very Highly Concentrated 
72.0 70.2 Highly Concentrated 
78.9 82.1 Very Highly Concentrated 
74.0 74.7 Highly Concentrated 
50.2 57.8 . Moderately Concentrated 
59.4 56.0 Moderately Concentrated 
84.2 84.7 Very Highly Concentrated 
80.5 85.9 Very Highly Concentrated 
100.0 100.0 Very Highly Concentrated 
95.3 96.7 Very Highly Concentrated 
99.0 100.0 Very Highly Concentrated 
44.6 44.7 Low-Grade Concentration 
86.6 89.0 Very Highly Concentrated 
74.2 73.9 Highly Concentrated 
73.8 79.3 Very Concentrated 
94.4 96.6 Very Highly Concentrated 
64.6 65.2 Highly Concentrated 
87.1 91.6 Very Highly Concentrated 
84.7 89.3 Very Highly Concentrated 
63.2 66.3 Highly Concentrated 
' SOURCE: "Concentration in the Meat Packing Industry," P&S, AMS, USDA, in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC Authority and General Small Business Problems of the Committee on 
Small Business, House of Representatives, 96th Congreu, 2nd Session, "Small Business Problems in the Marketing of Meat and Other Commodities," (Part 7-Monopoly Effects on Producers and Consumers), 
Washington, D.C., April 29, May 6 and 9, 1980. 
• These 23 states accounted for over 96% of the total fed cattle marketings in 1977. 


























Overcharge Estimates for Boxed Beef, 1975 
1972 % of National Sales % Overcharge from: Dollar Overcharge from: 
SIC Controlled by Four 
National Price-Cost National Price-Cost Code 
Industry 
Largest Firms (CR,) 
Brand- Equation Brand- Equation 
Private (3)' Private (3) 
Label Label 
Model' Model 
Percent Percent Millions of Dollars 
2011 Meatpacking 22 (1972) 0 0 $ 7 $ 0 
Boxed Beef 61 (1975) 8.2 4.9 143 107 
With Advertising' 
(Special Estimate) 
' Percent overcharge applies only to the value of consumer product sales shipped under manufacturer brands. 
• Percent overcharge applies to the value of all product shipped by food manufacturers, including producer goods. The denominator includes both manufac-
turer brand and private label sales of consumer ·products. 
• Boxed beef estimates are based on the following variable values: CR,=61, ADS4=.75% (same as for broilers and hams), Size=$2.2 billion (derived from 
USDA estimates of 1975 boxed beef production), and Firms=50 (estimated from USDA survey of boxed beef firms). All other variables in the equations are 
held constant. It is assumed that net imports of boxed beef are zero and that all boxed beef is sold for final consumption, i.e. producer sales are zero. 
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